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G

lobal operations since 2001 highlight certain characteristics of the US
military’s emerging operating environment. Future operations will likely take place “amongst the people” in a wide range of unpredictable environments.1 Managing these conflicts will require extensive collaboration
between military and civilian agencies representing a range of governments,
intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. Likewise, general-purpose forces (GPF) will make larger contributions to tasks
previously reserved to special-operations forces (SOF). These two components will experience greater intermixing and burden sharing.2
In ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, effective senior leaders are those able to grapple successfully with the dynamic
emerging environment and its functional implications. Along the way, leaders have developed important insight regarding the characteristics of successful commanders and the measures required to ensure future leaders possess
these characteristics. As the Department of Defense seeks to develop a cadre
of senior joint force leaders for operational and strategic command in “multimodal conflicts,” these views are worthy of serious consideration.3
To illuminate and begin to codify attitudes toward strategic-level
leadership development, the authors selected a group of SOF and GPF leaders who have commanded at the colonel or Navy captain level and higher in
recent irregular and hybrid warfare environments.4 In extensive interviews,
they reflected on the characteristics required for effective senior-level leadership and provided recommendations for leader development. Their responses highlighted the characteristics, educational experiences, and assignments
this cohort considered relevant to success in the unpredictable operating environments of today and tomorrow.
Dr. Barak A. Salmoni is a political scientist, Jessica Hart is a research assistant,
Renny McPherson is an adjunct staff member and former project associate, and Aidan
Kirby Winn is a project associate, all at the RAND Corporation.
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Characteristics of Strategic Leadership
The interviewees’ reflections on necessary strategic leader characteristics fall into three broad categories: cognitive, interpersonal, and managerial styles. Each style comprises a cluster of qualities, skills, and cultivable
traits that the officers associated with each other. With respect to the first style,
interviewees focused on cognitive processes aiding in problem-solving. Most
prominently, interviewees distinguished between “how-to-think” and “whatto-think” approaches, with the former embracing flexibility of mind and
diverse intellectual disciplines. How-to-think approaches emphasize the importance of understanding the parts of a problem in relationship to each other,
as well as the different perspectives and needs that problem-solving partners
contribute. Such approaches entail developing problem-solving methodologies that serve to reconcile competing viewpoints while remaining focused
on the goal. A how-to-think framework also accounts for consequences of
decisions, over time and across multiple levels and lines of operations, while
tolerating iterative problem-solving in the absence of perfect solutions.5 As
one GPF officer said, “It’s being able to look at a problem, think about the
influences associated with the problem, think about potential solutions to
the problem, and go deeper into the second- and third-order effects.”
Officers considered the how-to-think method essential for cultivating other important cognitive qualities, particularly the ability to think analogically from one case to another. Interviewees spoke of stepping outside
events and intellectual processes to observe in real time how they and others proceed and learn. One corps-level commander referred to this method
as “going up onto the balcony,” with one SOF leader similarly emphasizing the ability to turn observations into course corrections in dynamic time.
These comments suggest the need for leaders at this level to “see inside
their own thought processes” through “meta-cognition,” or “thinking about
thinking.”6 Interviewees valued such approaches not solely because they
helped officers make the switch to operational from tactical, and to strategic from operational. They praised the ability to harmonize tactical actions
with operational objectives and strategic goals, beginning with recognizing
a decision’s implications at each level. Harmonization requires coordinating
actions in an attempt to reinforce one another and influence multiple target
audiences, while maintaining the necessary strategic long view.
A second cluster of characteristics frequently referenced by interviewees focuses on interpersonal styles. Among them, sociability and a preference for relationship building are regarded as absolutely critical to every
aspect of planning, leading, and managing complex operations. In fact, interviewees frequently associated terms such as “communicator,” “facilitator,”
“consulter,” and “collaborative space maker” with the term “commander.”
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In many cases, commanders in combat and other contexts also preferred to
“command through influence.” In this respect, a fundamental responsibility of strategic leadership entails building bridges across institutional divides Officers considered the howthrough cultivating sincere personal to-think method essential.
relationships. One senior Marine put
it this way: “This is a people business.
Success in this comes from relationships.”
Interviewees at every level reinforced the need for cross-cultural capabilities and affirmed the utility of language and foreign culture skills, with
SOF leaders acknowledging critical shortfalls in this area.7 Underlining the
critical importance of multiculturalism, one interviewee having an immigrant background emphasized his equal comfort and competence in the
“two worlds [and] two cultures” of his parents and the English-speaking
United States. He felt that background primed him to be comfortable in operations with other services and branches of government, other countries’
security forces, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Indeed, while
endorsing the need to work effectively in the cultures of foreign nations,
many interviewees went on to affirm a much broader conception of multiculturalism: the capacity to work comfortably, seamlessly, and empathetically with interagency counterparts, members of other services, and NGOs,
in spite of differences in institutional cultures and processes.8 Likewise, the
most senior SOF and GPF interviewees considered the ability to communicate across the SOF-GPF institutional and cultural divide as a key strategic
leader characteristic.9
Enablers of multiculturalism and relationship focus include a fusion
of confidence and humility, which produces openness to different ideas, even
from other organizations or subordinates. Humility is also expressed through
approachability and humor. Interviewees noted humor as a defining characteristic of their successful seniors, with one combatant commander seeing humor as helping leaders to embrace an “output orientation . . . through
a spirit of collaboration” driven by “social energy.” According to a former
Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) commander and
senior service civil affairs leader, this social energy permits “staff guerrilla
warfare” or, in the words of a GPF division-level commander, “maneuver
warfare in the gaps and seams” of bureaucracies, based on personal relationships and the avoidance of explicit confrontation.
A final set of characteristics considered critical to irregular warfare
leadership relates directly to a leader’s managerial style. Respondents noted
three characteristics in particular: communication skills, an understanding
of organizations, and mentorship. Articulating thoughts logically and clearly was viewed as basic to successful leadership. “The number-one skill at
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the senior level, even at field-grade level, is to write.” SOF and GPF educators lamented the absence of this skill among many mid-level officers. Interviewees underscored the importance of tailoring communication to different
audiences, inspiring the acceptance of ideas requiring collaboration among
diverse partners. Interviewees considered communication a core function
of highest-level leadership, involving the generation of a compelling idea;
conveying it effectively and continually to stakeholders; ensuring it is appropriately communicated by subordinates to institutional implementers; and
reinforcing the idea through action. As one senior GPF leader said, “True strategic leadership is about trying to get the big ideas right, and it is then about
communicating those big ideas effectively to your subordinate leadership.”
Regarding organizational skills, officers at every level spoke of coordinating the activities of task-oriented staffs whose members represented
multiple organizational interests. This task necessitated understanding organizational dynamics and cultures at the conceptual and applied levels. In
fact, some interviewees pointed to a form of strategic leadership that was
purely organizational in focus, distinct from but required for combat leadership. They regretted the absence in their professional military education
(PME) of a focus on organizational theory.
Finally, interviewees perceived a strong relationship between leadership and mentorship. The majority considered a leader-teacher-mentor functional triad an inherent responsibility of commanders at every level. As such,
today’s best leaders consciously guide and teach their juniors, through both
explicit instruction and exemplary conduct. Mentors also exercise a tacit
though compelling moral suasion; “He [my mentor] was someone you never wanted to disappoint” was a frequent theme in this regard. A significant
minority felt that mentorship included guidance of junior leaders toward
developmental assignments, and efforts to ensure the availability of opportunities for rising leaders to demonstrate their skills. More significant is the
strong valuation placed on mentorship as part of a leader’s managerial style,
as well as the oft-heard misgiving that neither individual branches nor services provide adequate channels for its development. Some respondents felt
a mark of leadership was the rigorous pursuit of mentorship from senior colleagues: “Mentorship is a two-way street.”
Alongside these three elements of a strategic leader’s managerial
style, several respondents, to include two combatant commanders, a theater-level commander, and a commander of global SOF elements, pointed
to additional attributes as integral to credible leadership in an operational
context. These attributes begin with baseline tactical excellence, partly as a
matter of authenticity among juniors; equally, tactical prowess allowed senior leaders to understand implications at the unit level of operational decisions. The higher operational and strategic levels of leadership, however,
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require a fusion of physical, mental, and psychological endurance. As senior
theater-level commanders put it, physical strength sustains “grinding” intellectual exertion: “You have to have the physical component . . . . Soldiering
is still an outdoor sport.”
Taken together, interviewees felt these cognitive, interpersonal, and
managerial styles typified the best of today’s GPF and SOF senior leaders
operating in hybrid environments. Of course, such leadership styles are also
useful in conventional contexts. Not only did interviewees note these traits
in leaders they had admired since the 1970s,10 but existing military doctrine
also calls for similar characteristics.11 Yet, at least one theater commander felt
these characteristics “highly important, particularly in preparation for being
an irregular warfare leader” in environments characterized by kinetic limitations, diverse partners, and different kinds of conflict occurring simultaneously. Furthermore, most respondents felt it possible to cultivate these styles
throughout a career. Interviewees asserted it was the duty of individuals to
develop these leadership characteristics throughout their career, with military
organizations providing the appropriate opportunities and incentives.
Key Experiences
In explaining the significance of the leadership characteristics they
highlighted, interviewees made frequent reference to the paths their own careers had taken. Their collective experiences present a number of important
commonalities in the domains of education and developmental assignments.
First, a variety of broad educational experiences is found among most senior
officers’ careers, including early joint schooling as well as civilian education. Second, most interviewees served in joint billets, not simply once or
as a senior field-grade officer, but at various career stages in operational and
staff capacities. Third, many officers cited holding a senior-level staff, aide,
or assistant position as being significant to the remainder of their career.
Along with gaining perspective on organizational dynamics at the macrolevel, interviewees felt that being a military secretary to a senior Department of Defense (DOD) civilian, or an aide to a service chief, provided
insight into how senior leaders think, plan, and interact, as well as an opportunity for one-on-one mentorship. As one interviewee said, “Being an aide
is an opportunity no one else gets to see the man behind the mask and the
inner workings of the Army.” Fourth, for many SOF interviewees, a position permitting GPF exposure was significant. One theater-level commander with a SOF background considered an assignment to conventional forces
as “highly important” to his development. Finally, substantive international
exposure through education or assignments is beneficial. Collectively, these
experiences appeared crucial to cultivating characteristics that permit the
joint force to counter hybrid and irregular threats.
76
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Broad Educational Experiences
The range of education proving useful to interviewees featured service PME, out-of-service PME, and educational experiences beyond traditional military schooling, to include civilian education. While most officers
believed service PME was valuable, many suggested a need for improvement. One SOF colonel spoke to deficiencies in the military education system, primarily at the senior leadership level, when he said, “We don’t educate
to be generals.” While not all career tracks demonstrated extensive educational opportunities outside the military, specific types of PME were integral
to leadership development, particularly when PME for majors or lieutenant
commanders was either with another service or some other more flexible
version of military schooling. These settings include the College of Naval
Command and Staff, School of Advanced Military Studies, and Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). In these experiences, schooling reinforces jointness
and how-to-think cognitively in a military context. According to one SOF
commander:
At NPS, I learned not what to think, but how to think. When I was
a commander [later], we would have discussions where leadership
would try to figure out a solution. I would listen and think the solution was easy. But others couldn’t figure it out because they didn’t
see the problem the way I did. It was because they hadn’t been taught
how to think.

Though commanders’ courses, war colleges, and general officer capstone
courses aid in this effort, many interviewees recommended that officers constantly seek ways to broaden horizons beyond the tactical and operational
levels, so the services do not “start having generals who want to think like
battalion commanders.”
While not all interviewees experienced an education at civilian institutions, those who did found it of the greatest value in their evolution
to strategic-level leadership. Presenting ideas to nonmilitary students—and
learning to accommodate for civilian approaches to national security—contributed dramatically to thinking, communicating, and relationship-building skills. Civilian education permitted an understanding of the relationship
between the legislative and executive branches in the formation of national
security strategy and the authorization of military operations. One senior
SOF leader felt his civilian experience “was massively valuable because I
learned that the military is not the center of the universe. It showed me how
much else was out there.”

Spring 2010

77

Salmoni, Hart, McPherson, and Kirby Winn

Joint Billets and Interagency Exposure
Exposure to joint and interagency environments throughout a career
facilitated interpersonal and managerial growth for the interviewees and
aided in the transition from the tactical to strategic. Referring to his own
experiences with a special-mission unit, one officer articulated a consensus
in saying that he would have preferred to understand better the interagency process prior to a combat deployment as a commander. That knowledge
would have permitted greater leverage and synchronization. A recently deployed theater commander spoke of the value of interagency exposure: “You
have to learn to interact with those who have totally different backgrounds
and value sets, like [the Department of] State. They have a different value
set that they celebrate. SOF should increase its interface in every part of the
interagency, to include mid-grade leaders.”
Others spoke of joint billets as important to providing a perspective
that embraces diverse military options of equal value. Rather than limitation
to the minimum number of mandatory assignments for promotion to general
officer, interviewees opined that joint exposure should be frequent. A senior
SOF educator said, “You need to get joint as fast as you can. Get in to other
units, other opportunities. You are at a disadvantage if you think there is only
one way to do things.” While one combatant commander felt jointness should
grow from a foundation of service and functional competency, other respondents considered joint exposure equal in importance to service competency,
the former necessary for the latter:
Do you wait, and get service competency first? I disagree. Joint and
service are part and parcel; how can you be competent in one without
seeing the other? We are going to always fight joint at every level. It
needs to be the whole career, [and] it strikes me as odd that there is
anything but that. It’s all joint.

Senior Staff Roles
A large portion of the interviewees agreed that Pentagon assignments
or staff jobs at combatant commands are “essential to gain senior command
perspective.” Nearly every three- and four-star interviewee advocated staff
time at the Pentagon or a combatant command. Such tours are significant to
giving a mid-career officer an understanding of how to coordinate and resource theater-level operations, leverage interagency capabilities, and harmonize the functions of a large organization’s disparate elements. As one
former CJSOTF commander said, “It would have made me a better tactical
leader if I had understood the strategic side better.”
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GPF-SOF Intermixing
For many SOF members, a GPF billet during their field-grade years
was instrumental to understanding how large organizations function. Because SOF officers typically lead small, elite teams, this exposure to a large
organization is valuable for future leadership assignments. Special operations interviewees also felt increased intermixing and cross-socialization
permit better GPF understanding of SOF. A former CJSOTF commander
indicated, one “need[s] to be able to explain to GPF leaders . . . how what
you are seeing and proposing helps them and their tactical, operational, and
strategic goals . . . synching all of this with a theater-level strategy.” As they
rise to the theater and global level, SOF leaders will need to coordinate with,
and even command, GPF formations, while general-purpose leaders will find
special-operations elements under their command or in their battlespace.
One special-mission unit commander emphasized this point, noting that
“there needs to be a hybrid military.” Individual SOF leaders should pursue
GPF billets, and officers in both components should seek to work together
in supporting and supported roles. A general-purpose force combatant commander and his special-operations force deputy concurred, “We absolutely
recommend GPF billets for SOF and SOF billets for GPF.”12
International Exposure
The majority of interviewees placed a special premium on acquiring international exposure in order to foster skills important to the uncertain
battlefields of irregular warfare (IW). Interviewees particularly cited recurring training experiences while deployed with foreign militaries as ideal for
understanding diverse national security cultures, the United States’ status
in regional calculations, and the art of the locally possible. This expertise
allows one- and two-star generals or admirals to manage regional security
relationships at the DOD level. Equally as significant for theater-level IW,
training experiences facilitate first name-basis relationships with local military leaders that prove crucial to multinational operations. While coordinating multinational special operations, one interviewee said, “I knew these
guys, from Germany [and the] UK.” Another indicated that his Jordanian
SOF liaison had been a classmate. Individuals should seek international exposure at various points during their career, whether with NATO partners,
through foreign education, hosting of international officers at US schools,
or in more autonomous “Foreign Area Officer-like” contexts.
Some officers also highlighted the utility of pre-accession experiences, such as backpacking in the Arabian Peninsula or extended travel through
South Asia. They credited these experiences with making them comfortable
in foreign areas and introducing them to those very regions in which they
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later operated as senior commanders. One SOF interviewee reflected that
in operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan after traveling there as a youth,
“I was coming home.” Another SOF commander related, “I have been immersed in foreign cultures for extended periods of time. That puts you outside your comfort zone and forces you to adapt.” These experiences teach
officers how to interact with other cultures, cultivating patience, humility,
and curiosity. For those without pre-accession multicultural experiences,
time in uniform interacting with foreign civilians proved equally valuable.
One senior Marine leader commented, “My United Nations Palestine tour
prepared me for my leadership post. It was ‘immersion training.’”
Concerns and Cautions
The interviewees agreed on much of what is required to shape IW
leaders—both characteristics as well as essential formative experiences.
Yet, more than three-quarters expressed the belief that the career paths preparing them to lead effectively had been anomalous, diverging from service
norms. Likewise, many felt their progression to senior command billets relied on happenstance. According to one deputy combatant commander, “My
career has been an aberration. I am surprised I have achieved up to this level.” These views emerge from interviewees’ sentiments and perceptions of
service institutional preferences, rather than from statistical assessment of
the officers’ careers.13 More significantly, however, these senior leaders acknowledged the underlying value of their particular experiences to career
progression, and also expressed the desire for their services to value such experiences institutionally. This concern is significant, as interviewees shared
their views at a critical juncture in the life of the organizations they represent.
Operationally, the US military is engaged in sustained, complex multitheater
operations. Organizationally, both SOF and GPF are experiencing structural
growth. The confluence of these operational and organizational trends renders the recommendations of today’s leaders quite relevant to the future.
Kinetic Emphasis
Operationally, today’s company- and field-grade officers have experienced a great amount and diversity of combat experience far exceeding that
of their predecessors, which grants them an unprecedented degree of tactical prowess and operational ability. A former CJSOTF commander said, “In
my career [prior to 2001], you’d be lucky if you had one or two live missions in a career. We now have kids [captains and majors] that do four to five
missions a night.” The latter’s ability to think and adapt to changing tactical
circumstances is much more honed. Likewise, the extended performance of
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conventional US forces in increasingly diverse roles has ensured that GPF
junior leaders are skilled in core IW competencies.
Yet, combat exposure entails an opportunity
cost. Summing up the operationIt is critical to provide
al
implications
of repeated deployments,
the right educational
opportunities, both inside one theater special operations command
and outside the military. leader stated, “We’re paying a price. We
have accepted that as the price for defending our country, even if we don’t realize it.
I believe, hope, and pray that we can restore some balance to our deployments and our operational tempo. I hope that group [a Special Forces group]
can go back to what really matters, building partner capacity so that those
we train can do things for themselves. I look at that now as a transition because we are at war.”14
Beyond the operational implications of kinetic operations are those
events related to developing required leadership characteristics. In discussing the latter, interviewees often referred to noncombat experiences, considering them instrumental in developing necessary senior-level leadership
skills. Due to continuing commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, today’s
captains through Navy commanders or lieutenant colonels may not be able
to take part in these developmental experiences. One might argue that it
is today’s senior leaders who missed out—on combat. Yet, if noncombat
and nonmilitary assignments were contributing factors in the mid-career
preparation of today’s senior leaders for theater- and global-level success,
it would only seem logical that it is equally important to ensure that tomorrow’s senior leaders receive similar developmental opportunities.
While operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demand diverse capabilities, a sustained focus on a single operational mode (counterinsurgency tinged
with counterterrorism) and geographic area (Muslim eastern Middle East and
South Asia) can narrow perspectives, at the very stage in a career when they
need to be broadened. As one combatant commander put it, “War can be a
narrowing education . . . . It’s the dramatic instance fallacy,” whereby younger officers come away from an experience feeling “I went to Iraq; I now
understand all war.” A deputy combatant commander and career special operator agreed, opining, “We’re so focused on the war that we have people
only doing that, and not getting the broader experience . . . . Sure, we want
guys with that war experience, but . . . we need broader [perspectives].”
An early operational career dominated by combat might influence an individual’s understanding of what it means to be a leader in future environments. According to a SOF component commander, “It is easy to be wooed
by the siren of the kinetic,” and as the latter becomes the dominant operational mode for both SOF and GPF, it can influence values and career prefer-
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ences. The very breadth of their careers and the diversity of their noncombat
experiences have taught today’s senior leaders, however, that “nothing that
direct action forces do is decisive,” and that “victory is not in the killing.”15
Interviewees’ comments suggest that to become the next generation’s strategic, global-level leaders, today’s emerging leaders should take advantage of
every opportunity to pair their exemplary tactical and operational skills with
the educational experiences and developmental assignments examined here.
Organizational Growth
Beyond the influence of current operations on senior leader development are the implications associated with organizational expansion. In response to the diverse security challenges facing the United States, both GPF
and SOF are growing in size.16 This expansion will permit SOF and GPF to
maintain operational tempo and gain the time and space for the developmental opportunities the interviewees recommended. This balance is critical,
especially as it relates to the socialization process of newly minted special
operators. It will permit them to understand important relationships: kinetic
versus nonkinetic means, direct action versus “by, through, and with,” and
SOF specificity versus integration with GPF.
The growth in special-operations forces will be of tremendous benefit to the future joint force if it avoids the systematization and bureaucratization that discourages the diverse experiences responsible for producing
today’s senior IW leaders. Some SOF interviewees articulated this concern
as an instinctual disquiet that “big is the enemy of SOF.” More pointedly, a
current US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) strategist suggested
that the growth of his component might result in “Big Army-like” practices, where specific and narrow command and staff billets might be preferred
over broadening assignments.
A final organizational concern relates to the impact of more than a generation of SOF cultures. Over time, different SOF components have come to
understand and work effectively with one another, but it was a major concern
to at least four respondents, with experience as combatant command, corps,
Joint Special Operations Command, and CJSOTF commanders, that there
was a real possibility of attitudinal self-insulation of SOF from GPF. One
suggested that while today’s SOF leaders were “born joint,” their younger
counterparts might have a more narrow view of what joint means: “I think
sometimes in the SOF community, we think of joint as joint with other SOF
. . . . It’s not the broader joint.” Likewise, commanders who have led both
“black” and “white” SOF units decried the channelization of special operators into one or the other track, so that, particularly for “black SOF,” leaders
who are colonels or Navy captains and higher are “myopic” in perspective.
As one corps-level commander with a short time in SOF put it, a one-star ad82
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miral or general who has spent his whole career in “black SOF” will “be very,
very good at running operations. If we want him to run SOCOM as a four-star
we would have done him a disservice, [because] he won’t know how to command a large organization.” Along with other organizational changes and the
complexion of current operations, narrow career paths in the developmental
phase may be precursors of even narrower career preferences at the senior
levels, with implications for strategic perspective.
Institutional Changes
To achieve a strategic perspective equal to their tactical and operational prowess, today’s officers need to pursue the developmental opportunities interviewees highlighted. The joint force and DOD should institutionally
support and leverage such choices. The experiences and reflections of interviewees suggest four central institutional recommendations. First, service and DOD leadership should create more “opportunity space” for the
educational and developmental assignments that foster the cognitive, interpersonal, and managerial skills previously discussed. Such opportunities
will contribute directly to the ability of these officers to succeed in the joint
and interagency communities at the highest operational and strategic levels.
Second, the DOD needs to institutionally encourage the type of interaction
among its subcomponents and the interagency and international partners
that are likely to be of strategic value. Third, DOD should implement service-appropriate methods for systematically identifying prospective leaders
at the mid-grade point in their careers, thus enabling them to take advantage of developmental opportunity experiences. Fourth, branches, services,
and the DOD as a whole should establish institutional policies to support
the “out-of-the-mainstream” preferences by officers that support the development of leadership characteristics. This process may require a shift in
organizational culture, in terms of consideration for promotion, staff assignments, and command. Ultimately, the objective is for mid-career officers to
gain a conviction that far from imperiling their careers, these nonstandard
assignments will help them advance.
Opportunity Space
In order to effectively create opportunity space, it is critical to provide the right educational opportunities, both inside and outside the military.
A common thread among interviewees was that PME itself did not provide
an adequately broad, liberal education. An Army senior leader opined, “A
broad educational base is a necessity . . . . It is something that is in most cases the most beneficial to conceptualizing strategy.” Despite the criticality of
senior military education to developing a broad background and strategicSpring 2010
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level leadership, most interviewees did not believe their PME alone was adequate to accomplishing that objective.
Interviewees’ suggestions to address PME shortfalls centered on
“out-of-the-comfort-zone experiences.” As noted, this concern can be addressed through civilian education and “broader” PME. The services will
need to implement the opportunities for civilian education recently allowed
by DOD policy.17 Given the requirement for today’s senior leaders to build
and manage complex organizations, organizational dynamics should be part
of the curricula at intermediate and senior-level schools. One interviewee
explicitly recommended that organizational theory become a core element
of military PME, and others endorsed that suggestion.
SOF leaders were concerned with education specifically relating to
their community. Though praising initial training, interviewees noted the
lack of a career-long SOF continuing education program. As one senior educator stated, “Our training is great . . . . I give us an A-. But on the education
side, I give us a C+.” Some spoke very highly of the Defense Analysis program at NPS, while others touted the benefit of SOF electives at various staff
colleges. Most thought, however, that what was missing was clear guidance
delineating the type of educational experiences appropriate to SOF. Special
operators would benefit if SOCOM or individual service components articulate a “consolidated SOF educational trajectory.” While not dictating a
single educational path, this program should link existing SOF educational
assets in a logical progression, while maximizing out-of-service opportunities in keeping with this new developmental strategy.
Interactions of Strategic Value
The interviews highlighted the need for institutional support of a series
of sustained interactions: between general-purpose and special-operations
components, “white” and “black” SOF, and the military with the interagency
and NGO communities. While these interactions do occur, they often take
place during in-theater operations. Interviewees felt it would be much more
useful for such interactions to commence prior to deployment. The services
and DOD could contribute markedly to leader development by ensuring that
this cross-pollination occurs early, possibly through assignments, internships, and training. Many interviewees felt that SOCOM and DOD should
diversify the nonkinetic experiences associated with the “black SOF world.”
Beyond interactions between contributors to theater- and global-level
irregular warfare, interviewees felt US personnel needed to increase their interaction with a broad array of foreign militaries. Reflecting on international
opportunities and the gains they provide to cross-cultural understanding, one
interviewee remarked:
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We need to maximize experiences with foreign officers. We have to
get more of them here and more of us over there . . . . We have very
few US officers overseas (at foreign military schools). That’s a problem . . . . We should fund visits to foreign countries for those officers who became close with foreign officers who came to the United
States.

Requiring and incentivizing these exchanges at the individual and unit level
will pay dividends in operational capability and military-to-military diplomacy.
Diverse Career Paths
The skills and experiences that the majority of interviewees viewed
as critical for leadership development were generally outside standard career paths as officers understood them. Many considered themselves lucky
to return to the service mainstream in order to contribute their experiencewon skills. To eliminate this paradox, services and branches should use both
the stick and the carrot by requiring a combination of educational and developmental experiences and honoring nonmainstream assignments through
promotion and consideration for command. According to a combatant commander, “The system . . . has to tolerate nonstandardness. We should celebrate it.” A fellow combatant commander concurred, asserting “you want
people who specifically come from different career paths.” Though some respondents suggested formalizing the consideration process for advancement
based on nonstandard merits, most felt “it would be very difficult to do so.
You can’t create committees. You do it by taking steps to ensure that these individuals are promoted and progress and that there are opportunities for these
people.” Interviewees affirmed that this “honor[ing]-through-consideration”
of nonstandard career paths should also be applied to officers who have developed a regional focus, as well as to noncombat arms leaders whose planning, leadership, and management skills ensure overall IW effectiveness.
Officers for Mentorship
Identifying exceptionally talented leaders remains a challenge. Most
interviewees felt “we generally get it right” with respect to identifying prospective future leaders. Some, however, were uncomfortable regarding the
lack of rigor in identifying those officers at mid-career with the skill-sets,
abilities, and background to excel at leading in hybrid environments. According to one SOCOM component commander, “Sometimes guys who are
eye-wateringly good just don’t get noticed.” Again, while interviewees rejected a formal process, several did advocate a means to identify subordinates with an aptitude for these developmental experiences. For a number of
respondents, this would entail services inculcating in senior leaders an un-
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derstanding of mentorship that is predisposed toward guiding subordinates
who are deemed deserving.
Though not addressed by interviewees, identification and mentorship
are also significant from the perspective of the tradeoffs that the developmental and broadening experiences highlighted in this article entail. Such
tradeoffs present themselves in terms of increasing specific domain competency and familiarity with one’s own service. In confronting the constraints
of time—both in terms of career progression and operational tempo—it is
doubly important to develop programs and policies capable of identifying
the right officers, at the appropriate stages in their careers, for mentorship
and experiential broadening, if they are to develop the skills and abilities required to fill senior leadership positions in the joint force. Additionally, any
approach to identifying and mentoring a cadre of joint force senior leaders
will need to ensure that it provides opportunities for broadening exposure
that are balanced against the requirement to focus on specific expertise.18
Conclusion
Interviewees highlighted three clusters of characteristics necessary
for successful IW leadership: cognitive, interpersonal, and managerial styles.
These characteristics permitted them to understand their operating environment and plan successfully at the theater and strategic level. These same
characteristics prepared them to marshal human and organizational resources while also equipping them to lead and inspire subordinates. While indicating a preference for career breadth, interviewees valued similar types
of education, developmental assignments, and life experiences that cultivated the characteristics they deemed so important. In particular, they recommended diverse educational exposure, to include civilian institutions;
recurrent joint assignments and exposure to the interagency processes and
norms; assignments on theater- and strategic-level staffs in proximity to senior military and civilian leaders; substantive mixing between SOF and GPF
forces; and repeated exposure to foreign cultures and their militaries.
In order to ensure that current operational tempos and institutional growth permit availability for these experiences, interviewees suggested
modifications to institutional measures and policies. These recommendations
involved creating billets for emerging leaders that permit them to take advantage of nontraditional developmental opportunities, and institutionally rewarding them for doing so. Interviewees affirmed the need for rigorous and
sustained mentoring at the individual level, as well as development of institutional measures supporting mentorship. In sum, interviewees’ insight focused on ensuring that individual officers’ choices and institutional measures
increase the likelihood that the characteristics and experiences identified here
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are found among the joint force’s future leaders, who will grapple with the
challenges of diverse global operations in the midst of organizational change.
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